As the first global carbon fund, the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) aims to catalyze the market for project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions while promoting sustainable development and offering a learning-by-doing opportunity to its stakeholders. Since the inception in 1999, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country, because the World Bank and other international and bilateral donors expect great potential of the clean development mechanism (CDM) in China and feel the significant need for building CDM capacity in China to enable it to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. This paper first discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country of PCF projects until September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to endorse the PCF projects. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the PCF's offering prices for the emerging global carbon market. JEL classification: Q54; Q58; Q52; Q48
Introduction
In recognition of the potential impacts of climate change on its borrowing client countries, the World Bank has been participating in the climate change process since its beginning. This, combined with the limited existing capacity in developing countries and in economies in transition in originating CDM and joint implementation (JI) projects, led the World Bank to undertake a pioneering role in developing the market for greenhouse gas emission reductions through the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF, 2003) . 2 As the first global carbon fund, the PCF aimed to:
• demonstrate how project-based transactions in greenhouse gas emission reductions can contribute to the sustainable development of developing countries and countries with economies in transition;
• share the knowledge gained in the course of the PCF's operations with all interested parties; and
• demonstrate how the World Bank can work in partnership with the public and private sectors to mobilize new resources for its borrowing member countries while addressing global environmental concerns. The PCF operates like a mutual fund, pooling the collective resources from 23 investors (6 governments and 17 companies) and investing these funds in projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions or remove these emissions from the atmosphere and that would in many cases not be financially viable without financial support from the PCF. The PCF is not legally able to own these carbon credits generated from the PCF projects. These credits have to go back to those investors pro rata according to their level of investment in the Fund. Participants in the Fund agreed on a set of project selection and portfolio development criteria designed to serve the "learning-by-doing" objective of the PCF while reducing project risk through portfolio diversity. In practice, these objectives are achieved by balancing the Fund's portfolio between: CDM and JI; 4 geographic regions;
and eligible sectors and technologies and/or fuel switching in projects that create emissions reductions additional to a credible baseline of what would have happened without the CDM/JI project.
The World Bank and other international and bilateral donors are keen to support CDM capacity building in China because they expect great potential of the CDM in China and feel the significant need for China to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. Thus, since the inception, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country. This paper first discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country of PCF projects until September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to endorse the PCF projects in the end. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the PCF's offering prices for the emerging global carbon market.
Why had China hesitated to sign up as a host country?
With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great deal of low-cost abatement options available, many economic modelling studies indicate that China is widely regarded as the world's number one host country of CDM projects. For instance, the studies of Zhang (1999 Zhang ( , 2000 Zhang ( , 2001 Zhang ( , 2004 show that about 60% of the total CDM flows in 2010 go to China. The similar findings are also founded in the World Bank-led study on the CDM market potential, the results of which suggest that China will capture about 50% of the world's CDM market in 2010 (World Bank, 2004) . But, making this potential a reality represents a significant challenge for China, because there has been a general lack of awareness by both the Chinese government and business communities, institutional structure, and implementation strategy. This has raised great concern about China's ability to compete internationally for CDM projects and exploit fully the potential. The World Bank and other international and bilateral donors feel the significant need for CDM capacity building in China to enable it to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. For this, since the inception, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country. The PCF experience suggests that completing the first carbon deal in a host country is a powerful capacity building tool, with tremendous impact on supply on its own (Lecocq, 2003 (Weyant and Hill, 1999) . This may be the basis of China's expectation for high price of carbon credit. However, these estimates are made when the U.S. is part of the Protocol. The point is that, the U.S. being the biggest single buyer on the international market of tradable permits, its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol breaks the balance of the buyers and sellers on the international permit market. The studies focusing on the implications of the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol (e.g., Löschel and Zhang, 2002) show that the U.S. nonratification leads to a sharp drop in the price of permits on the international market. 7 Author' interviews in Beijing, January 2004.
continues to purchase VERs even if the project itself eventually fails to get registered under the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, most buyers purchase certified emission reductions (CERs), thus passing on the registration risk to the seller. In this case, because the seller is more exposed to project risk, it thus comes as no surprise that CERs, on average, have been traded at a higher price than VERs. The carbon market study by Lecocq and Capoor ( 2005) there are some concerns about the formal status of PCF projects regarding whether they can eventually be recognized as CDM projects. To be recognized as CDM projects, the baseline methodologies of the PCF projects have to be approved by the CDM Executive Board (EB). At the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host country, the CDM EB approved a total of nine baseline methodologies. The PCF 8 The risk of non-delivery for the PCF, a carbon buyer, is mitigated by purchasing VERs on delivery rather than upfront. Although a project developer is able to use this carbon purchase agreement as a collateral to leverage financing that would otherwise not have been available, the host country and business's risks associated with the underlying project remain, unless the carbon buyer is able to share these risks with the project developer (Lecocq, 2003) .
submitted the eight methodologies for its own projects, but only got the two methodologies approved (JIQ, 2004) . At that time, it was difficult to predict which portion of the PCF portfolio would eventually be covered by approved methodologies.
But the bottom line is that as more methodologies get approved, the regulatory uncertainty regarding the status of the PCF projects will further diminish. By December
2004, approximately 60% of the PCF portfolio was covered by approved or nearly approved methodologies (Ringius, 2005) .
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Figure 1 Prices of project-based carbon credits
Source: Drawn based on data from Lecocq and Capoor (2005) . The CDM EB has to date approved the 23 baseline methodologies (JIQ, 2005) . However, it should be pointed out that not every project developer needs to propose a new methodology to the EB for consideration and approval. A project developer is free to opt for using a methodology previously approved by the EB, if appropriate. 
What led China to endorse the PCF projects?
Despite the difference in opinion, negotiations between the PCF and China have never As indicated in Figure 2 , four years into the placement phase, the PCF has reviewed over 490 project idea notes, but only signed 16 ERPAs with a total value of US$ 74.3 million (PCF, 2004) . 12 The information cited below on the PCF funding contributions and the received amounts of emissions reductions for these two PCF projects is taken from the PCF web site at: http://carbonfinance.org (accessed on 27 July 2005).
The coal bed methane project is the first World Bank-supported CDM project in China. 14 The PCF has signed an umbrella agreement with the Chinese government on the purchases of 20 millions of CO 2 -equivalent at the price of US$ 4.25 per ton of CO 2 -equivalent. But for each PCF project, a fixed price needs to be agreed through the negotiations between the PCF and the specific project developers. This way to share the price risk provides incentives for both parties to perform. Some PCF contracts provide the project developers the opportunity to sell a fixed volume of the annual emissions reductions, which are generated above the amount due to the PCF, to a third party (PCF, 2003) . Alternatively, under the Dutch CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender) program, the contractor must offer the surplus of generated CERs to Senter (the tendering authority for the CERUPT) at the market price of the CERs at the time of delivery before it can do so to any other party, although Senter is in no way obligated to purchase more CERs than are agreed upon in the contract (Senter Internationaal, 2001 ). Another reason is related to weak demand for CERs, which makes it much hard for China to negotiate with the PCF on the price. It is conceivable that China's side is keen to ensure that the carbon credits from China have a high value. However, as shown in Table   2 indicating the prevailing price levels for CDM projects at less than US$ 6 per ton of CO 2 -equivalent at the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host 15 The spending ceiling set for China is not fixed. Third, China hopes to use those projects on the margin to gain much-needed, real learning. Recongnising that it is hard to change the situation in weak demand in the short run, China thought that it is whorthwhile undertaking some PCF projects, in particular those PCF projects that fall into the priority area under the CDM in China (The Chinese government has prioritized the areas of the CDM investment. The priority areas for CDM projects in China are energy efficiency improvement, development and utilization of new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilization.) and whose local developers are determined to undertake these projects and need the funding on the margin. In this case, the funding from the PCF is considered additional. Undertaking these projects will provide much-needed, real learning and practice about baseline setting, project boundaries, monitoring and verification at project levels, these aspects that are most relevant to all prospective projects under the CDM but in which China has gained little experience in the AIJ (Activities Implemented Jointly) pilot phase. The different attitudes towards the AIJ pilot phase among the Chinese ministries concerned at the beginning put China at the slow starter of AIJ projects. As a result, China has only hosted 5 AIJ projects, with 4 projects registered with the UNFCCC Secretariat (see Table 3 ). For all these projects, there have been quite tough bilateral negotiations between China and the investor countries. The estimated unit costs of abatement for these registered projects are very high. Other EU 3% Netherlands 30%
PCF 26%
At the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host country, the maximum purchasing price that the PCF paid for the VERs was US$ 3.75 per ton of CO 2 -equivalent (see Table 1 ). This is very much in the price range of US$ 3.5-4.0 per ton of CO 2 -equivalent, which was set in 1999 at the creation of the PCF. continuous regulatory uncertainties. Moreover, they have greater flexibility than the private sector in determining the types of CERs that they are willing to purchase. Thus, if they are just interested in getting cheap CERs, there will be no strong incentives to encourage potential investors to develop CDM projects, in particular those sustainable projects like renewable energy projects. No doubt, the additional cash flow from CDM credits can boost the internal rate of return. But, the aforementioned World Bank-led study on the CDM market potential found that this added value from the current low price of CERs is insufficient to cover the incremental costs of implementing many CDM projects in China (World Bank, 2004) . Put another way, the corresponding stream of CERs will be rarely the decisive factor that makes the most significant difference and renders these projects viable. This, combined with the lead times required for CDM projects and the current highly debatable process to review and approve CDM projects by the CDM Executive Board, raises both the concerns about China's ability to fully capitalize on its CDM potential and the uncertainty over whether there will be sufficient amount of CDM credits available for meeting the demand from the EU and other Kyoto- HFC23 is a by-product of the production of HFC22, which is used as a refrigerant and a raw material for the production of fluorinated resins. HFC23 is a very potent greenhouse gas. Its 100-year global warming potential is 12, 000 times that of CO 2, implying that releasing one ton of HFC23 in the atmosphere is equivalent to 12, 000 tons of CO 2 emissions. a whole range of other CDM projects. All this clearly suggests that having the appropriate price level of CERs is critical for the development of CDM market, because, in the long run, the price of CERs, either too high or too low, would severely hamper the development of the market. From the preceding discussion, it thus follows that, to promote the sustainability and expansion of the World Bank's carbon finance initiatives (including the PCF) as an integral part of the Bank's mission to reduce poverty, mobilize resources for carbon financing, and to build the global carbon market over the long run, China and the World Bank should work together on the price issue. It is in their interests. The World Bank is there to promote and demonstrate how the market can work and to help catalyze the carbon market. However, the current, low price levels of CERs would have led its borrowing clients either to spend too much time on negotiations on this or to approve few CDM project proposals than what would otherwise have been the case. Thus, the Bank has an obligation to react to this concern of its borrowing clients as well as that of its lending clients. In the meantime, chairing the Host Country Committee of the World Bank's Carbon Finance Business (CFB), 19 China is now able to play an even more proactive role in either pushing for the various carbon funds managed by the CFB to pay 19 A host country of the PCF projects is entitled to be a member of the Host Country Committee if it has signed a memorandum of understanding or a letter of endorsement (or at least a letter of no objection) with the World Bank. Membership of the Host Country Committee has grown from less than 15 in the first year of PCF operations (PCF, 2003) to over 50 now.
a more favourable price 20 or demanding that the offering prices are differentiated according to technology types. Indeed, as shown in Table 4 , the offering prices of CERs under the Dutch CERUPT program are differentiated according to technology types, with renewable energy projects in general assigned with a premium price. This will broaden project types that carbon finance renders viable (Indeed, this has increased the number of renewable energy projects in the Dutch CERUPT portfolio to 75%). After all, the transactions of the PCF and other carbon funds managed by the CFB, although they are significant in comparison with the current carbon market, account for only a small portion of the total projected emissions reductions required for Annex I countries to meet their Kyoto targets. Much work remains ahead to stimulate both demand and supply so as to progressively scale up project-based carbon transactions and create the necessary liquidity in the global carbon market.
